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Introduction
Mises made some observations on cooperative businesses, i.e., firms col-
lectively owned and run by their workers. These firms may perfectly emerge 
in a free society, however, for Mises the elimination of  the private business-
man was a sacrilege. Not everybody can be a businessman, as the cooperative 
ideas tend to imply. The businessman is one especially perceptive agent whose 
existence is central to the market economy. This agent needs encouragement 
and he needs to think on his own to have clear ideas: Mises describes him as 
the talented individual. The businessman seems to have different psycholog-
ical features than the common people. His existence does not increase, but re-
duces, sales costs. Mises claims: “In terms of  popular psychological teaching 
we can say that some have the ability to adjust themselves better than others 
to the conditions of  the struggle for survival. We may therefore – without in-
dulging in any judgment of  value – distinguish from this point of  view be-
tween superior men and inferior men” (Mises 1961, 190). Mises assumed the 
existence of  “better races” and for him, the masses do not think (Mises, 1961, 
pp. 195-6). “They did not fail to see that the immense majority of  common 
men are both too dull and too indolent to follow and to absorb long chains 
of reasoning” (Mises, 1969, p. 16). Thinkers in a market economy are, of course, 
entrepreneurs. In short, Mises presents an elitist vision of the market in which 
there is a natural inequality that needs to be recognized and that precludes 
cooperative business from the market economy. In order to encourage entre-
preneurship and risk-taking individuals, this inequality is, and must be, the 
basis for wealth inequality. 
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Permit me to recapitulate some well-known facts. While under precapitalistic con-
ditions superior men were the masters on whom the masses of  the inferior had 
to attend, under capitalism the more gifted and more able have no means to prof-
it from their superiority other than to serve to the best of  their abilities the wish-
es of  the majority of  the less gifted” (ibid). 
Mises thought that Eurocentrism was the proper outlook (see Tucker and Roc-
kwell, 1991).
But is this elitism part of  the core of  Austrian methodology or is it only a part 
of  Mises theory? This article will try to ascertain if  the Austrian School of  Eco-
nomics defends an unequal psychology of  the agents. For this purpose, it deals 
with the debate on the cooperative movement as, conversely, the cooperatives as-
sume equality of  entrepreneurial abilities.
Carl Menger’s concept of the entrepreneur 
For F. A. Hayek (1992, p. 62), the Austrian school’s “fundamental ideas 
belong fully and wholly to Carl Menger. ... [W]hat is common to the mem-
bers of  the Austrian school, what constitutes their peculiarity and provided 
the foundations for their later contributions, is their acceptance of  the teach-
ing of  Carl Menger”. However, the precise contribution of  Menger (1840–
1921) is not clear. In particular, Menger’s concept of  entrepreneurship was 
not fully new. His ideas were based on Jean Baptiste Say’s definition of  the 
entrepreneur (actually, Say was the first to coin the term “entrepreneur” in 
1803). For Say (1836, p. 78), the entrepreneur shifts economic resources out 
of  an area of  lower and into an area of  higher productivity and greater yield 
(see Forget, 1999). But, the same as after Marshall (1890, book IV), who con-
sidered organization a fourth factor, Say values the entrepreneur not for be-
ing a risk-taker but predominately for being a “planner” (Brewer, 1992, p. 51). 
In this sense, Say was not at odds with Adam Smith’s concept of  the entre-
preneur, although Say did provide a praiseworthy description of the entrepre-
neur while Adam Smith distrusted his behaviour.
Indeed, according to Smith, what makes the capital increase is neither the 
major inventiveness nor the “exceptional man”, but “the skill and judgment 
with which normally the work is done” (Smith, 1976, p. 27).1 Smith consid-
ered that the prudent man achieves the greater achievements in the market 
economy. He saves and invests to obtain the ordinary profit in lines of  pro-
1. As Khan (1954) says, Smith gives importance to the role of  capital and it is not indus-
try but parsimony or abstinence the reason for gain. But once capital is being accumulated, 
money makes money almost in an immediate way. Based on this idea, Smith created a theory 
of  stadiums in which development begins in small-scale agriculture.
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duction more or less known. He has the quality of  abstinence and he is a man 
of slow but sure progress, who contents himself  with small gains. He makes 
his projects with enough current information and taking into account the re-
lation between expected profit and acceptable risk, provided that he knows 
that only if  he saves he will be able to increase the quantity of  his capital in a 
constant way. Then, Smith puts more emphasis on automatism to restore mar-
ket equilibrium than on the innovative function of  entrepreneurs (Trincado, 
2009). But the problem with entrepreneurs is that sometimes they are haugh-
ty and imprudent people, and they do not take into account the unpredicta-
bility of  time, subduing the investor to a moral risk under the bias of  asym-
metric information.
On the other hand, Say (1836) distinguishes the adventurer from the cap-
italist. The occupation of the adventurer is setting industry in motion, that is 
to say, the application of acquired knowledge to the creation of a product for 
human consumption. The adventurer requires a combination of moral quali-
ties, judgment, perseverance, and knowledge of the world, as well as of busi-
ness. He is called upon to estimate, with tolerable accuracy, the importance of 
the specific product, the probable amount of the demand, and the means 
of its production; in a word, he must possess the art of  superintendence and 
administration. He must have a ready knack of  calculation, to compare the 
charges of  production with the probable value of  the product when complet-
ed and brought to market. 
The same as Say, what Menger wanted was to establish a causal link be-
tween the subjective values underlying the choices of  consumers and market 
prices used in the economic calculations of  businessmen. The process of  im-
puting value from lower-order goods (consumption goods) to higher-order 
goods (production goods) is inseparable from the idea of  time, a process of 
change inherently uncertain. This uncertainty associated with production can 
be greatly mitigated by the improvement of  technological knowledge, which 
may be general or possessed in a monopolistic way by an agent who foresees 
desires, which are “planned and conducted... by an economizing individual” 
(Menger, 1976 [1871], pp. 159-60). In this sense, Menger seems not to be elit-
ist in his understanding of  the entrepreneur. He described the economizing 
individual as a coordinating agent who is both a capitalist and a manager. 
The entrepreneur owns resources and decides how they will be used. The en-
trepreneur’s most important function is anticipating future desires, estimat-
ing their relative importance, and acquiring the technological knowledge of 
currently available means. But entrepreneurial activity comprises a number 
of  additional functions: “economic calculation”, involving the various com-
putations needed to ensure the technical efficiency of  the production process; 
“the act of  will” by which higher-order goods are purposely allocated to the 
chosen production process; and “supervision” of the execution of the produc-
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tion plan so that it may be carried through as economically as possible. The 
last two functions entail property-ownership and, therefore, mark the Men-
gerian entrepreneur as a capitalist-entrepreneur (Salerno, 2000).
But then, what is Menger’s contribution to the concept of  the entrepre-
neur? His entrepreneur is no more than what Brunner and Meckling (1977) 
call the REMM: the resourceful, evaluating, maximizing man. As Schumpet-
er (1969, p. 86) alleges, his contribution to economics is not about the agent 
of  the entrepreneur, but “the discovery that ... human needs are the driving 
force of  the economic mechanism beyond the Robinson Crusoe economy or 
the economy without exchange. ... His essential aim is to discover the law of 
price formation”.
The roots of the Austrian Economics School’s concept  
of the entrepreneur 
Menger published his principles in 1871 and by the mid-seventies his writ-
ing and teaching had begun to attract a number of  brilliant followers, most 
notably Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser, leading to an 
identifiable Austrian school. But, when dealing with the question of  the en-
trepreneur, this Austrian School of Economics sided with another French tra-
dition different from Say’s theory. Not in vain, France was the birthplace of 
“mercantilism”, which considered merchants the agents who have, and should 
have, a crucial role in economics, precisely what Adam Smith criticized. This 
other tradition traced its roots back through A. R. J. Turgot and Richard Can-
tillon to the scholastic writers of  the Middle Ages and it was based not only 
on subjectivism, but also on phenomenalism and idealism as against Smithi-
an realism (Trincado, 2006). 
Those authors had Cantillon (1755) as a forerunner (see Brewer 1992). Can-
tillon introduced a specific concept of the entrepreneur (Nevin, 2013). Entre-
preneurs, according to Cantillon, are agents who buy at a certain price and sell 
at an uncertain one and, so, they accept the risk of the market, making the cir-
culation and the exchange of goods possible. “They pay a fixed price for them 
at the place where they are purchased, to resell wholesale or retail at an uncer-
tain price. ... These entrepreneurs never know how great the demand will be in 
their city” (Cantillon, 1755, p. 74). But, more importantly, entrepreneurs are 
special agents distinguished by a lesser aversion to risk than the masses. They 
link different successive moments of time thanks to a special skill: the want of 
imagining the future. Actually, Cantillon divided society into two principal 
classes – fixed income wage-earners and non-fixed income earners (although 
there are other two classes: politicians and property owners, see Hülsmann, 
2002, p. 698). Entrepreneurs, according to Cantillon, pay known costs of pro-
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duction but earn uncertain incomes, due to the speculative nature of pandering 
to an unknown demand for their product (see Tarascio, 1985). Furthermore, 
unlike later theories of entrepreneurship which saw the entrepreneur as a dis-
ruptive force, Cantillon anticipated the belief that the entrepreneur brought 
equilibrium to a market by correctly predicting consumer preferences.
This is also the stance of  utilitarian authors of  the nineteenth century 
based on philosophical individualism, the individual being the only judge of 
his own actions. These authors are actually the forerunners of  marginalism 
and of  Mises theory of  the entrepreneur. Jeremy Bentham, who wrote quite 
original economic works on entrepreneurship in the late eighteenth century, 
such as Defence of Usury (1787) and Manual of Political Economy (1793), may 
be considered a forerunner of Austrian Economics (Trincado, 2004). For Ben-
tham, the role of  technological change in entrepreneurship and economic 
growth is very important, something he pleaded in defence of  a free market, 
as the entrepreneur – the projector – in a centrally planned economy is not 
interested in the nurture of  technological innovation for his own interest:
I mean projectors: under which invidious name I understand you to comprehend, 
in particular all such persons as, in the pursuit of  wealth, strike out into any new 
channel, and more especially into any channel of  invention...; whether it consist 
of  the production of  any new article adapted to man’s use, or in meliorating the 
quality, or diminishing the expense, of  any of  those which are already known to 
us... whatever is now establishment, was not, at one time, innovation? (Bentham, 
1818, p. 12).
With this concept of the entrepreneur, Bentham was criticizing Adam Smith 
and the fact that, although Smith knew Cantillon’s work, he decided to present 
a person that decides and faces the risk as a routine (Spengler, 1975). Bentham 
reproaches Smith having underestimated the role of the “men of talent” that, 
thanks to their invention and imagination, are responsible for the progress and 
wealth of the nations, provided that they find new channels of trade and open 
new ways towards the future. Bentham speaks about the productivity increased 
by new arrangements of the means of production, especially in manufacturing. 
Innovation is the force that drives development because “what is now an insti-
tution, once was an innovation” (Stark, 1952, p. 355). Bentham also complains 
that Smith relates prodigals with speculators. The second follow routine mod-
els of behaviour, they stand out from the mass, so they are part of a very re-
stricted elite that need courage and genius. Bentham shows here then an aris-
tocratic conception and contempt of the common people. Projectors depart 
from routine patterns of behaviour, break away from the common herd; and in 
the process discover new markets, find new sources of supply, improve existing 
products, or lower costs of production. He mentions two cases in which cour-
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age, not genius, is necessary: the opening of a new market, and the search of a 
new source of supply. When we add two other determinants of innovation – the 
production of a new good, and the introduction of a new method of produc-
tion – we have four of the five new combinations that Schumpeter (1934 [2008]) 
details in “Theory of economic development”. The businessman introduces im-
provements, and here, Bentham uses italics for the word improvement due to 
the fact that he distinguishes between improvement (a new method of combin-
ing resources for productive purposes) and invention (scientific progress). Pro-
jectors create utility, Bentham (1952, p. 170) argued, by effecting improvements, 
whether such improvements consist in the production of any new article adapt-
ed to man’s use, or in meliorating the quality, or diminishing the expense, of 
any of those which are already known to us (see Stark, 1952a, 170) from De-
fence of Usury and Hébert and Link (2006, 302).
As Pesciarelli (1989) says, Smith considered the “ideal man” the current 
and frugal man whereas Bentham – and Schumpeter – enthrones the excep-
tional and adventurous individual. Schumpeter (2008, p. 70) even said that 
talent “rides to success on its debts”. According to the Smithian theory, this 
idea of  managerial activity introduces a Messianism, similar to the one intro-
duced by mercantilism with the state. Provided that the market or the individ-
uals cannot face the process of  growth, a Messiah with semi-divine charac-
teristics is required. If  Bentham shows an aristocratic attitude, Smith shows 
a certain preference for the middle and low conditions of  society, and espe-
cially for the middle, the saving class according to Smith (1997, p. 132 and 
pp. 140-1). People from the middle classes who have not been born rich but 
who have a small quantity of  capital save and invest it. As Santos (1997) says, 
we can relate this explanation to Milton Friedman’s theory of consumption, 
based on the concept of  “permanent revenue”. 
Curiously enough, against the definition of pleasure presented by Hume, 
for Bentham risk is a foreseen “pleasure” and the pleasures are more intense 
the more uncertain they are (Dube, 1991, p. 97). The function of the entrepre-
neur, then, is to capture the utility of the final good beforehand, foreseeing the 
pleasures of the public in a context of uncertainty. So, as we shall see, Ben-
tham is close to the figure of the businessman described by Kirzner, in which 
the role of surprise and discovery are typical of the managerial creative func-
tion (see Kirzner, 1998: 275-6 in Annex; and Huerta de Soto, 2000: 189). 
Austrian economics versus the cooperative movement in Vienna circles
This concept of  the entrepreneur by Bentham lies outside classical eco-
nomics and is the basis for Mises theory. Mises relied on Cantillon’s and Ben-
tham’s elitism in questions of  entrepreneurship. For a better understanding 
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of this idea, we are going to turn to the debates on cooperatives and socialist 
calculation. 
The champions of cooperative organizations assume equality in manageri-
al abilities and are against the particularity of the agent or the entrepreneur. 
Everybody has a calculating ability; in social terms, this also means that the 
state may calculate, as particular agents calculate in the market. So, they defend 
an anti-elitism that pleads for a change in society that will lead to a self-man-
agement where people have the full stake in matters that affect their lives.
Within the Vienna circles, Friedrich von Wieser wrote a piece on the co-
operatives (Genossenschaften) favouring social economics and a mixed econ-
omy in the tradition of  the eighteenth century Cameralism, in contrast with 
Menger’s individualism (Chaloupek, in Cardoso and Psalidopoulos, 2016, 
10). Besides, John O’Neill (1988) points to epistemological parallels between 
Hayek and Otto Neurath, who advocated a kind of “associationist socialism” 
in which meso-level social institutions (like cooperatives) would play a major 
role. But looking at the official academic representatives of  the economic the-
ory of cooperatives at Vienna University (Genossenschaftswesen), we see that 
they often belonged to the collectivist camp (Spann circle), not to the individ-
ualist school of  Carl Menger. 
The reason was the influence of  Othmar Spann. Spann was an Austrian 
philosopher who was a key influence on German conservative and tradition-
alist thought in the period after World War I, the New Right (Sunic, 1990). 
He defended universalism based on nationalistic values and collectivity, to-
tality or whole (Spann, 1930, 61). This was a denial of  individualism and the 
atomistic view of the market. Like Adam Müller, who was under the sway of 
the Romantic School (Müller, 1812), Spann rejected both capitalism and so-
cialism, and advocated a corporatist system relatable to the guild system of 
the Middle Ages. There, fields of  production were organized into corpora-
tions directed by administrators in service to the state. According to him, ex-
treme competition creates disharmony and weakens the spiritual bonds be-
tween individuals (Spann, 1930, 162). Although Spann was not Marxist, he 
said that “Marx nevertheless did good service by drawing attention to the in-
equality of  the treatment meted out to worker and to entrepreneur respective-
ly in the individualist order of  society” (ibid, 226). Spann held that all indi-
viduals in society should hold the same position, eliminating all class 
distinctions, and should receive the same amount of  goods. However, democ-
racy in political systems was completely rejected by Spann with the argument 
that the manipulation of  government by wealthy capitalists and financiers 
with questionable moral character and goals was in disagreement with the 
good of  the community. Besides, he considered that people are unequal in 
qualities and thus are suited for different positions in the social order. De-
mocracy, by allowing a mass of people to decide governmental matters, meant 
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excluding the right of  superior individuals to determine the destiny of  the 
state. Spann noted that “demands for democracy and liberty are, once more, 
wholly individualistic” (Spann, 1921, p. 111, quoted in Wassermann 2010, 
p. 80). So, he defended the “subordination of  the intellectually inferior under 
their intellectual betters” (Spann, 1921, p. 185, quoted in Wassermann 2010, 
p. 82). Individuals who demonstrate their leadership skills and right ethical 
character would rise among the levels of  the hierarchy.
The early success of  the Austrian School came to an end with the collapse 
of  the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, as in the new republican atmos-
phere many Marxists began to take positions of  power. To his students, Mis-
es lacked the fame and brilliance of other professors of  the department of law 
and government science, such as Spann (see Hülsmann, 1989, 2f). Mises – and 
Wieser – dealt with technicalities of  the marginal value analysis, Spann con-
fronted the students with a broad picture of  social life, and he also impressed 
young scholars of  the Austrian School such as Hayek and Morgenstern. 
However, in the University of  Vienna, the students who did not share Spann’s 
aesthetic, epistemological and political orientations – a minority – found an 
alternative in the courses of  Friedrich von Wieser who, in the years after 
World War I and up to his death in 1926, was the unquestioned authority in 
general economic theory in Vienna. Even in the field of  the theory of  money, 
banking and business cycles, and of  socialism, Mises was not the very high-
est authority, as Wieser pioneered the Austrian theory of  money (see Hüls-
mann, 2007, 471). 
However, Hayek and others, such as Haberler, Strigl and Machlup, worked 
with Mises for more than ten years. Not in vain, Mises’ criticism of Spann’s 
idea of the community avoided him being linked to the leaders of the so-called 
“Austro-fascist state”, including Von Starhembert, Engelbert Dollfuss and 
Kurt Schuschnigg, so influenced by Spann’s ideology (Bischof et al, 2003). But 
Mises did not raise a “school” of  disciples advocating his doctrines and, to 
no small extent, this was due to his ideal of  individualism (Hülsmann, 2007). 
Mises had stepped into the idealism of Schiller, Heder and Humbold, and 
considered the free development of  the individual to be the supreme goal 
of human achievement. However, Mises later made it clear that his rejection of 
Spann’s approach had nothing to do with a dogmatic insistence on the virtues 
of  methodological individualism; the point was, rather, that the nature of  sci-
ence according to him was to deal with parts, rather than with wholes, stud-
ying the interrelations of  those parts (see the discussion in Mises [1933] 2003, 
42-50).2
2. Also personal differences were underlying, as Spann was influenced by anti-Semitism 
and Mises was a Jew.
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Thanks to Hanks Mayer’s presence, the Wieserian paradigm was dominant 
in Vienna long after Wieser’s death. Actually, Mayer obtained Wieser’s chair; 
although there were more prominent economists as candidates, such as Joseph 
Schumpeter, who at that moment held a position at the University of Bonn, 
and Gustav Cassel from Sweden, who promoted Walrasian mathematical eco-
nomics and was famous for his rejection of utility theory as a foundation of 
price theory. So, the fourth generation of the Austrian School was introduced 
to Austrian economics primarily through the works of Wieser. Wieser – and 
F. A. Hayek – emphasized knowledge, discovery and market process. Wieser 
saw the entrepreneur as owner, manager, innovator, organizer and speculator 
and, without the market, he would not have the information given by prices; 
but he has no special gift to solve the problem of uncertainty.
So what happens with Mises then? Besides interest, the central novelty of 
Mises analysis of  the market economy seems to be his emphasis on the role 
of  the entrepreneur. But he was taking Cantillon’s and Bentham’s idea of  the 
entrepreneur and, although he got rid of  Spann’s idea of  subordination, he 
maintained Spann’s ideas of  inequality, in this case applied to the agent of 
the entrepreneur (Mises, 1990). 
Mises made a distinction between entrepreneurs who take successful ac-
tion in an uncertain world, and entrepreneurship in the sense of  a fundamen-
tal economic function – the bearing of risk under uncertainty (see Hülsmann, 
2007, 764). Mises made some observations on the cooperative movement. Co-
operative businesses, that is to say, firms collectively owned and run by their 
workers, may perfectly emerge in a free society. However, Mises takes pains 
criticizing their existence and showing their inefficiency. The cooperative 
movement set out to abolish the wages system and give a share to each work-
er in the property and products of  the firm where he is employed. For Mis-
es, cooperatives are not a method of  world reconstruction. The cooperative 
movement struggled for the elimination of  entrepreneurs and capitalists al-
together as “useless exploiters”. But, for Mises, the elimination of  the pri-
vate businessman, the “middleman”, is a sacrilege. This perceptive agent 
needs to think on his own. He needs solitude and encouragement to have 
clear ideas, as he is describes as the talented individual. His existence does 
not increase, but reduces sales costs. According to Mises, cooperatives can-
not stand the competition of  private business without the aid of  special gov-
ernmental privileges and favouritism. Besides, he says, cooperatives of  the 
time were not based on an ideal of  direct cooperation. They were big busi-
nesses with millions of  members who never met one another. They were or-
ganized in a complicated hierarchy. The competitive market economy is, 
Mises says, more democratic than the cooperative organization as it is es-
sentially social cooperation under the division of  labour for the production 
of  goods and services consumers want to use. So, private profit-seeking 
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businesses, not cooperatives, are harbingers of  economic improvement 
(Mises, 1990).
Mises points out that there is no freedom in “laws of  nature”. The con-
cept of freedom, and its antithesis, makes sense only in referring to conditions 
of  social cooperation, which is the basis of  any really human and civilized ex-
istence. Only in a free society, Mises says, one has the individual the power to 
choose between morally praiseworthy and morally reprehensible conduct. He 
adds that:
The market economy is the full and only possible realization of  the principle of 
economic democracy. The market process is a daily repeated voting in which 
every penny gives a right to vote. The buyers, by preferring those commodities 
which in regard to price and quality are best fitted to satisfy their needs, make 
and conduct of  each enterprise profitable or unprofitable, make small-size busi-
ness big and penniless beginners rich... It is true, these ballot papers are not equal-
ly distributed among the public. ... But to be rich is in itself  the outcome of a vote 
taken, as in the market economy not only the acquisition but no less the preser-
vation of  wealth requires continuous success in best supplying the consumers 
(Mises, 1990, 263). 
Political democracy embodied in representative government is supposed 
to be the corollary of  the economic democracy of  the market. This system 
will preserve peace in both domestic and foreign affairs as, following Hume’s 
claim, a government not supported by the majority must sooner or later lose 
its power as it can be violently brought down. This theory also implied a crit-
icism of Austrian circles of  power, maybe even at university:
A capitalist social order unhampered by interventions, therefore, provides for a 
permanent selection among the capitalists and entrepreneurs... Why can incom-
petent people in the German Reich and in Austria remain CEOs for many years? 
Because in an interventionist state these executives are selected primarily in re-
gard to whether they enjoy a good reputation with the higher authorities... (Mis-
es to Bermann, letter dated 10 September, 1931, Mises Archive, 95:22).
Schumpeter had a similar point to Mises when dealing with entrepre-
neurship. According to Schumpeter (2008), entrepreneurs are innovators 
who constantly interrupt the operation of  a static economy. Innovation plays 
a central role in the market economy as entrepreneurs reap profits for inno-
vation and, in this sense, he contradicts the Mengerian insight that all in-
comes depend on consumer wishes. Actually, Mises reconciled Schumpeter 
with Menger saying that entrepreneurs cannot earn a profit for innovation 
per se – only for innovations that improve the satisfaction of  consumer 
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wants. They constantly adjust the structure of  production to what they ex-
pect will be the future preferences of  consumers, with an expectation of 
profit in the future. 
However, for Schumpeter (1942), as opposed to Mises, socialism can work 
and it will fit together with democracy. Capitalism cannot survive as it tends 
toward corporatism. The “creative destruction” that describes innovative en-
try by entrepreneurs is the force that sustains long-term economic growth, 
and this innovative quality makes capitalism the best economic system (see 
Heertje and Jan, 2006). But the intellectual and social climate needed to al-
low entrepreneurship to thrive will not exist in advanced capitalism; it will be 
replaced by socialism in some form. Majorities will vote for the creation of  a 
welfare state and place restrictions upon entrepreneurship that will burden 
and eventually destroy the capitalist structure. In Schumpeter’s view, social-
ism will ensure that the production of  goods and services is directed towards 
meeting the “authentic needs” of the people – disregarding the purpose of the 
prices of  disclosing the needs of  the people – and will overcome some innate 
tendencies of  capitalism, such as conjecture fluctuation, unemployment, and 
waning acceptance of  the system.
Other Austrian economists on entrepreneurship 
The Austrian line created by Mises seems to be based on philosophical in-
dividualism. Actually, one feature of the radical “subjectivism” of Austrian 
theory versus the classical school is the supremacy of strategic, self-interested 
behaviour that gives play to the Austrian theory of the entrepreneur, as against 
the neoclassical world, where explanations of economic phenomena consist of 
applications of cost-benefit calculus and maximization subject to constraint, 
a deterministic framework (Garrison, 1995). In the Austrian world, the mar-
ket process is driven by alertness, or entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner, 1989), 
that lies outside the cost-benefit calculus. Positing alertness, entrepreneurship 
is a sine qua non (Kirzner, 1979, p. 142). The subjective perception of infor-
mation is an essential element in Austrian methodology (see Thornsen, 1992, 
and Kirzner, 1997, pp. 60-85). 
Kirzner deals with the discovery of  opportunity (Foss and Klein, 2012). 
The definition of  the entrepreneur is the agent that deals with how, by whom 
and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are 
discovered, evaluated and exploited. Kirzner argues that a competitive mar-
ket is superior because it best generates entrepreneurial discoveries. Rothbard 
(1974) criticized Kirzner for not emphasizing the role of  entrepreneur as un-
certainty-bearer, the same way as Mises had emphasized that the entrepreneur 
has an anticipative understanding of an uncertain future. However, Kirzner 
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makes abstractions to establish that the “pure” entrepreneur is an individual 
who only performs a discovery function. He discovers new resource uses, new 
products, new markets, and new possibilities for arbitrage. Entrepreneurship 
is the act of  grasping and responding to profit opportunities. The pure entre-
preneur is one who owns nothing at all. Market equilibrium is, in essence, an 
imaginary construct in which individuals have perfect knowledge, resources 
are dispersed perfectly according to everyone’s preferences. Therefore profits 
and losses do not exist in market equilibrium. Kirzner argues that the entre-
preneur’s main effect is to push the economy closer to market equilibration. 
In short, he is an equilibrator.
However, according to Kirzner, alertness is exercised costlessly, and so any 
after-tax profits at all should suffice to call it forth. But then, why should cos-
tless alertness not be always exercised to the fullest, independently of  the ex-
istence of  a free or a regulated market? Shmanske provided an insightful an-
swer to these riddles by distinguishing between developing the capacity to be 
alert to profit opportunities and actually exercising the alertness. Cost-bene-
fit analysis applies to the developing but not to the exercising. Shmanske deals 
with the costs of  discovery. According to Shmanske (1994, p. 208), the indi-
vidual starts to think about formulating a new plan in an instant, so there is 
an optimal rate of  adjustment to the post-discovery situation, and the capac-
ity for alertness will be greater in a market-oriented, low-tax economy. He ar-
gued that those bold spirits – entrepreneurs – created technical and financial 
innovations in the face of  competition and falling profits and generated irreg-
ular economic growth. 
Kirzner’s approach has been much debated within the Austrian School of 
Economics. His conception of  the entrepreneur is by no means the dominant 
one among Austrians. In fact, it is not Mises’ idea. For Mises, the entrepre-
neur is a resource allocator, not an equilibrator. Good entrepreneurs earn 
profits while less capable ones earn losses. They attempt to anticipate the fu-
ture demands of  consumers and satisfy them. So, the same as Frank Fetter 
(1977), he considers human action and uncertainty-bearing the unit of  anal-
ysis, not the abstract “opportunities”. 
In this sense, Fetter is the one who better follows the idea of  Mises in his 
Economic Principles (1915). Fetter (1977) saw the entrepreneurial function as 
the key. He asserted that an entrepreneur organized and directed production 
while possessing superior foresight. Fetter’s theory has been briefly outlined 
in Salerno (2008). He anticipated Knight’s distinction between risk and un-
certainty. “The primary function of  enterprise is the choice of  a business in 
which to invest; the next, and essentially last function, is to provide compe-
tent management” (Fetter, 1915, p. 327). The entrepreneur must evaluate pro-
duction decisions and guide the production process through the selection of 
superior managers (1915, 327-342). Fetter goes on to emphasize the impor-
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tance of the uncertainty of business conditions for these entrepreneurial judg-
ments. This is the same distinction between entrepreneurs and managers 
drawn by Ludwig von Mises (1963). For Fetter, entrepreneurs differ from sim-
ple risk-bearers:
The risk of  business is not that of  the throwing of  dice in which (if  it is fair) skill 
plays no part and gains in the long run offset losses. Business risk is rather that 
of  the rope-walker in crossing Niagra; the task is easily undertaken by the skilful 
Blondin, it is fatally dangerous to the man of unsteady nerve and limb (Fetter, 
1915, p. 359). 
In this case, personal skill and intuition are used to deal with non-meas-
urable risks. Individual aptitude and insight are the key ingredients in dealing 
with this type of  non-quantifiable risk. Fetter also describes entrepreneurs as 
relieving labourers and capitalists of  the uncertainty involved in their employ-
ments, in other words, from unforeseen, potentially damaging, fluctuations in 
price (Fetter, 1915, pp. 364-365). This specialization in risk-taking is a form 
of insurance to those whose income is thereby rendered more certain. Person-
al prescience regarding the future movements of  market forces – and acting 
based on it – is an essential part of  entrepreneurial judgment. The entrepre-
neur also deploys “superior knowledge and superior insight” (Fetter, 1977, 
p. 244), and personal qualities of “vigilance, strength, and self-assertion” (Fet-
ter, 1915, p. 349). Fetter describes the entrepreneur as “the man who can see 
most quickly and clearly”. It is evident then that judgment is intimately tied 
up with the personality of the entrepreneur, depending as it does on skills which 
are uncommon. 
Austrian theory of cooperatives and of the firm
Due to its description of  entrepreneurship, Austrian Economics has no 
real theory of  the firm. In this sense, its disregard of  cooperatives is equalized 
to the oblivion of  hierarchical large firms – “Islands of  conscious power in 
this ocean of  unconscious co-operation”, as Robertson (1923, 85) defines 
Coase’s firms. However, its contributions could ultimately lead to an entre-
preneurial theory of  the firm based on the market process, property rights 
and the importance of information and tacit knowledge (Foss, 1997; Foss and 
Klein, 2002). For the Austrian School of  Economics, the only condition for 
entrepreneurial competition is not to have restrictions at the entry. Monopo-
ly is a result of  government restrictions. Even antitrust laws should be re-
pealed as they suppose a deterministic relationship between the market struc-
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ture and economic performance and they act against innovative business 
organizations (Armentano, 1999, p. Xi). 
But surprisingly, as we have previously said, Friedrich von Wieser sup-
ported cooperative associations as an organizational form of  large firms 
that could ameliorate the social condition of  workers. He dealt with issues 
such as private ownership of  the means of  production and economic ine-
quality, impact of  collective bargaining on wage formation, and public 
economy, and he discussed the contribution of  public sector production to 
social value (Chaloupek, 2006). Other Austrian economists have also defend-
ed cooperative organizations. Schweickart (1993) observes that the success 
of  the Mondragon cooperative complex in the Basque Country indicates that 
a libertarian socialist economy can flourish. Carson (2004) reconciles the 
Austrian and Marxist anti-statist theories. He defends that the end of  liber-
al democracy as a dominant political paradigm, and its replacement with 
philosophical anarchism and a decentralized and pluralistic political order, 
would naturally produce a brand new economic paradigm. The result could 
be an economic order where the worker-oriented firm replaces the capital-
ist corporation as the dominant mode of  economic organization (Preston, 
2003). Alan Carter (1992) defended workers’ cooperatives rebutting the claim 
that they merely replace exploitation by employers with “self-exploitation”. 
Carter says that this is non-sense because self-exploitation is a self-contra-
dictory term. However, workers’ co-operatives are still subject to “market 
exploitation” by dominant economic actors who are external to the co-op-
erative (for this concept, see Bies, Tripp and Neale, 1993). According to 
John O’Neill, however, these conclusions are mistaken because “market ex-
ploitation” is difficult to operationalise and “self-exploitation” may have a 
respectable use when it is understood as “institutional exploitation”. Cart-
er responds that if  people freely choose to organize themselves in a cooper-
ative basis, the structure can provide the preconditions for a workable an-
archy (Carter, 1992, 267).
On the other side, David Gordon (1996) says that in “team production”, 
in which workers must coordinate their activities on a joint endeavour, a ten-
dency is present for each individual to shirk. Why not, to the extent that one 
can get away with it, turn to other things and let one’s fellow workers bear 
the brunt of  the task? To deter this, monitoring is necessary. And the ques-
tion at once arises: what form of  monitoring is most efficient? Alchian gave 
strong reason to think that monitoring works better if  the monitor’s inter-
ests are independent from those of  the workers. From the workers own view-
point, it makes sense for them to hire themselves out rather than to manage 
their own work. They are likely to be more productive, and hence earn more 
money, if  they do so. The open corporation, though it separates ownership 
from control of  production, preserves many of  the efficiency advantages of 
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the classical firm. In addition, it enables vast sums of  money for investment 
to be raised.3
Debates on method and socialist calculation
In general terms, Austrian Economics does not derive optimism concern-
ing mankind’s future evolution from their epistemological convictions. Mark 
Pennington has looked at the implications of “spontaneous order theories” for 
deliberative democracy and the “politics of difference” (see Pennington, 2000). 
The same as Mises, Rothbard (2000) argues against egalitarianism. Intellectu-
als must disseminate a correct grasp of how a market economy operates to 
teach those blinded by ignorance and emotions. He also believed in the superi-
ority of the elite, and that society is filled with “ineducable masses” (Rothbard, 
1978: 122). Just as an example: he does not attribute the problems of blacks or 
other minorities to racism and prejudice, but to parasitic values of idleness and 
irresponsibility found in those communities (Rothbard, 1978: 154).
However, Menger’s fame was based on his criticism of elitism and the pa-
ternalism of aristocracy. Unlike Schmoller and his disciples, who defended 
government in the hands of  the professors, the bureaucracy or the Junker ar-
istocracy, Menger was highly critical of  the higher Austrian aristocracy (see 
Moser, 1997). The Austrian economists reject the logical relativism implied in 
the teachings of  the Prussian Historical School: there is a body of  economic 
theorems valid for all human action irrespective of  time and place. Intellec-
tuals must disseminate a correct grasp of  how a market economy operates to 
teach those blinded by ignorance and emotions. It is true that F. A. Hayek 
(1960) explained, “why I am not a conservative”. For him, conservatism, un-
til the rise of  socialism, was opposite to liberalism. As conservatism does not 
indicate another direction than current tendencies, it cannot prevent their 
continuation. But the Austrian professor David Prychitko describes the po-
litical culture of  his movement best: “Policy-wise, Austrians as a group tend 
to be political conservatives, although there are one or two of  us (including 
yours truly) who question its strictly conservative ideology. And, like all oth-
er schools of  thought, Austrians have their share of  cranks, crackpots, and 
weirdoes, who are best left ignored” (Prychitko, 2005). 
After 1819, the “Socialist Calculation” debate established the distinctive 
features of  Austrian theory, particularly the theory of  knowledge laid out in 
the seminal contributions by Friedrich von Hayek. Hayek (1945) claimed that 
prices are not merely rates of  exchange between goods, but rather a mecha-
3. Marxists claim that workers serve capitalists because they are forced to do so, and thus 
there is not prevailing freedom. But, in general, Austrians views are based on negative freedom.
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nism for communicating information. In his 1944 The Road To Serfdom, he 
pointed out that tyranny is the political corollary of  socialism. Hayek en-
larged his ideas in The Constitution of Liberty (1960). Endorsing the famous 
Humean definition of liberty as the rule of laws and not of men, Hayek shows 
the legal requirements for maintaining a commonwealth of  free citizens, a 
government by the people (representative government) instead of  by an au-
thoritative leader. He distinguishes between socialism and the welfare state: 
the welfare state is compatible with liberty under certain conditions. In Hayek 
(1988), the “fatal conceit” of Lange and other socialists was that they believed 
order could be “designed” by a planner who gets prices right. Socialists did 
not realize that limited knowledge constrains not only individuals but also 
planners. So, actually, entrepreneurs are not special agents that plan the fu-
ture better than the mass. Simply, “spontaneous order” arises from the inter-
action of  a decentralized group of  self-seeking agents acting in a price sys-
tem. Information is thoroughly distributed and the law of the big numbers 
makes the masses more informed than the elite, due to the statistical average. 
Conversely, for Mises, the authoritarian mode of  organization does not 
allocate resources according to their most highly valued use by individuals, 
but the market does (Streissler, 1988, p. 195). Even the welfare state trans-
forms the market economy step by step into socialism. If  the government does 
not repeal its first intervention, it is induced to supplement it by further acts 
of  intervention, until all economic freedom has been virtually abolished. Af-
ter leaving to the United States, Mises revised and expanded National okono-
mie into Human Action, which appeared in 1949. And this work remains the 
economic treatise that defines the Austrian School. Murray Rothbard estab-
lished a theoretical framework for examining the effects of  intervention in the 
market. He expressed sympathy for many of  the criticisms of  state capitalism 
advanced by the classical socialists, including Marx and Bakunin. However, 
he attacked them for blaming the market rather than the state for the exploita-
tion inherent in state capitalism. For Rothbard, the principal error of  most 
of  traditional socialism was its effort to achieve socialism by the reactionary 
methods of statism and militarism (see Raimondo, 2000). However, Rothbard 
(1962), in Man, Economy, and State, roots the Austrian School’s approach on 
a natural-rights theory of  property and the defence of  a capitalist and state-
less social order. In 1991, Professor Ebeling consulted with members of  the 
Russian Parliament in Moscow on free market reform and privatization of 
the socialist economies (Ebeling, 1994) in the former Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe (Ebeling, 1996), as well as on economic policy in the United States 
(Ebeling, 1995). The Austrian economist Boettke (2004) argues that Austrian 
libertarianism can be viewed as an impetus for a progressive research pro-
gramme in political economy that addresses issues of  social cooperation in 
case of  conflict.
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Many Austrians argue against political unification and cooperation, as is 
the case with Röpke. Wilhelm Röpke (1959) and the Ordoliberals think it pos-
sible to be internationalist on trade and isolationist in politics. The smaller the 
political unit, the closer government will be to the people, which means it will 
be easier to keep it in check and macroeconomic planning will be less feasible. 
At the same time, smaller political units are more dependent on trade with 
their neighbours, helping to build peace. Röpke opposes all post-war efforts to 
create a world government. He opposed the World Bank and the IMF, predict-
ing that these institutions would only exacerbate the problems of internation-
al debt and world inflation. The IMF, the same as the WTO now, is an insti-
tution that is designed to lead governments into regulations under the guise of 
harmonization and to support a bureaucracy conveying the impression that 
world trade depends on agreements among governments, not on spontaneous 
cooperation among producers and consumers. Razeen Sally (1998) shows that 
a libertarian concept of international policy seeks unsubsidized and unman-
aged free trade in decentralized political institutions. Jan Tumlir (1985) was 
also a strong opponent of  international government intervention. Hazlitt 
(1984) says that, as problems of balance of payments usually result from do-
mestic disorder, a super-governmental organization designed to give out for-
eign aid to balance trade tends to subsidize bad economic policies. So, the 
WTO should be abolished, along with the World Bank, the Federal Reserve 
System, and every other engine of inflation and statism in the world. 
Conclusion
In this article we have seen that Mises poses something of  an elitist theo-
ry, in which entrepreneurs seem to have a special perception of  the future. 
This psychological classification of agents is based on the Cantillon-Bentham 
tradition, in which the entrepreneur is a special agent with greater forecast 
ability; as against Say and Menger’s works, which define the entrepreneur as 
an organizer of  labour. Contact between Mises and the Spann circle in Vien-
na was a determinant feature of  his elitist vision of  the entrepreneur. Al-
though Spann defended nationalistic values and the whole, he also considered 
people to be unequal in qualities and thus suited to different positions in the 
social order. So he defended the idea that the individuals who demonstrate 
their leadership skills would rise among the levels of  the hierarchy. Some Aus-
trian economists have maintained Mises’ elitism, by default or through per-
sonal belief, such as Fetter. However, other Austrian economists give less im-
portance than does Mises to those special skills of  the entrepreneur. They 
argue that the spreading of information in a market-oriented economy makes 
it impossible for an agent to foresee the future, be it the state or the entrepre-
17470 RHI73.indb   97 29/6/18   12:52
The debate between the Austrian School of Economics and the cooperative movement
98
neur. The comparison between the arguments in favour of  cooperative firms 
and those posed by different Austrian economists may clarify the definition 
of  the agent presented by the Austrian School of  Economics. The assumed 
inequality of  the agents also affects their economic theory and the political 
arrangements that would emerge in a free society. 
Another conclusion is that Mises’ economic proposals are based on an 
optimistic sketch of  the market; however, his social ideas are based on a pes-
simistic Hobbesian view of the nature of  man. The market, as in Bentham’s 
theory, is guided by its hero, the entrepreneur. But society is guided by the 
mass principle. And for Mises, the masses do not think.  
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The debate between the Austrian School of  Economics and the cooperative 
movement. The assumption of  unequal perception among agents
aBstRact
In the economic theory of  the Austrian School, the market process is driven by entrepre-
neurial alertness, or discovery, where the subjective perception of  information is an essential 
element. According to Mises, this perception is unequal in different agents, as entrepreneurs 
are talented individuals that respond to encouragement. But some other Austrian economists 
defend cooperative arrangements, assuming that everybody has some entrepreneurial skill and 
could be the owner and manager of  the firm. This article poses the question of  whether or not 
it is necessary that the Austrian School of Economics defends an unequal psychology of agents 
that would preclude cooperative businesses from the market economy. It concludes that Mises’ 
contact with the Spann circle in Vienna was determinant in the creation of  his elitist vision of 
the entrepreneur.
keywoRds: entrepreneurship, Austrian economics, cooperative movement, alertness, mar-
ket economy
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■
El debate entre la Escuela Austríaca de Economía y el movimiento coope-
rativo. ¿Existe una capacidad de percepción desigual entre los agentes?
Resumen
En la teoría austriaca de economía, el mercado se mueve gracias a la capacidad de alerta, 
o el descubrimiento, del emprendedor, donde la percepción subjetiva de información es un ele-
mento esencial. Según Mises, esta percepción es desigual en diferentes agentes, dado que los 
empresarios son individuos con un talento especial que necesita estímulo. Pero otros econo-
mistas austriacos defienden las organizaciones cooperativas, suponiendo que todos tenemos 
habilidades emprendedoras y podemos ser el propietario y organizador de la empresa. Este ar-
tículo se plantea si es necesaria para la Escuela Austriaca de Economía la defensa de una psi-
cología desigual de los agentes que descarta la defensa de las organizaciones cooperativas. Con-
cluye que el contacto de Mises con el círculo Spann en Viena determinó su visión elitista del 
empresario.
palaBRas clave: empresarialidad, economía austriaca, movimiento cooperativo, capaci-
dad de percepción, economía de mercado
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